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Bangladesh’s responses to COVID-19 have been chaotic, uncoordinated and
operating within a legal blackhole. The first positive case was confirmed on 8
March when the government was preparing for the gala centennial of the birth of
the country’s founding leader, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Instead of
a lockdown, a country-wide ‘general holiday’ was imposed for two weeks from 26
March, and which was later extended until 5 May. The scope of ‘general holiday’
was extensive with the closure of all government and private offices, schools and
universities and, subject to stringent exceptions, all courts including the Supreme
Court. Interestingly, whenever any new COVID-19 case is detected, the concerned
suburb, village or district or, more particularly, the building is placed under ‘lockdown’
which is often done by an oral administrative order, so it is possible to have both a
‘public holiday’ and also a ‘lockdown’ as emergency measures taken in response.
Bangladesh is a unitary state with eight administrative divisions and 64 districts.
Officially it is a parliamentary democracy, which however has been on a severe
decline since the 2014 single-party elections, and with the recent 2018 elections
providing no exception. The lack of democratic decision-making and multi-party
constitutionalism has also been paired with an alarming rise of corruption. In the
current COVID-19 crisis, the Deputy Commissioners (the most senior public officials
in a district), executive magistrates, and the police all are in charge of enforcing
the law and executive orders to prevent transmission. While the Army has been
deployed in aid of the civil administration, the Bangladeshi Parliament, including the
Cabinet as the central decision-making body in any democracy, has largely taken a
back seat with no visible action.
Emergency Powers in the Constitution
The 1972 founding Constitution did not have general emergency powers except for a
provision on war (Art. 63). Emergency provisions (Part IXA: arts 141A—141C) were
incorporated in 1973 via the Second Amendment. They are largely pro-executive,
with a little role for parliament to play. Art. 141A states that the President may
proclaim a state of emergency on grounds of ‘war or external aggression or internal
disturbance’ with the previous written agreement of the Prime Minister. By a literal
interpretation of these three grounds, the Constitution seems to provide no room for
public health emergency, such as the outbreak of COVID-19. However, it may be
considered a source of internal disturbance.
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Although Bangladesh is using the metaphor of ‘war’ in its fight against COVID-19,
and given that the executive could have interpreted the term ‘internal disturbance’
to include the public-health emergency, the country chose not to impose a state of
emergency presumably in view of the previous abuses of emergency provisions.
(Bangladesh had imposed emergencies in 1974, 1981, 1987, and 2007 – all on
grounds of internal disturbances.) As explained below, however, Bangladesh has
nevertheless imposed a de facto state of emergency in any sense of the term except
in name. The consequences of the present COVID-19 restrictions are essentially
similar to those of any official emergency. One might therefore argue that an official
emergency in the interest of saving lives would have been a better approach.
Reliance on the Constitution for the declaration of a limited emergency would have
provided legitimacy and a more solid ground for the legal regulation of the COVID-19
crisis.
The only limitation the Constitution places on emergency powers is that it must not
be over 120 days in duration, unless the Parliament approves a longer period. Every
proclamation of emergency, therefore, needs to be laid before Parliament before
its expiry. (By law, the gap between two sessions of parliament must not exceed
90 days.) A declaration of emergency can lead to two major consequences:  First,
during emergency, ‘the State’ may make law or take executive actions in derogation
from six fundamental rights (Art. 141B): the freedom of movement, assembly,
association, thoughts and conscience, occupation and profession, and the right to
property (Arts 36—40 & 42). Second, the President may opt to ‘suspend’ the right
to judicially enforce these or other fundamental rights. Although a blanket power,
suspension of enforcement of fundamental rights may be avoided altogether or
restricted to a few rights only. 
The New ‘Legal’ and the COVID-19 Crisis
To gauge the nature of Bangladesh’s legal responses to COVID-19, it would
be useful to have an overview of certain facts and actions on the ground. The
Bangladesh situation is unique albeit mostly in a negative sense. It has one of the
lowest rates of COVID-19 tests: currently 64,666 in a population of 160 million, but a
comparatively higher rate of official deaths (168 out of 7,667 confirmed cases as of
30 April). Out of 64 districts, 47 do not have any ICU facilities at all. Yet the lockdown
was only imposed over two weeks after the first confirmed case.
The initial country-wide public holiday was declared on 24 March citing the Rules
of Business 1996, which is a constitutional instrument. The notification was quite
unclear in its effect, and, in just two days, a significant number of people left Dhaka
out of either fear or in holiday mode, raising the risks of transmission and infection.
Then came the closure of public transport on 26 March, later followed by a ban
on large gatherings in prayers and funerals. The legal authorities behind these
restrictions remain unclear. During the lockdown, ready-made garments industry
owners announced an imminent reopening of factories, leading thousands of
workers to rush back on foot to Dhaka. The workers then returned back home
following a government intervention, but the same saga has been repeated on 26
April, several days before the scheduled end of the restrictions on 5 May, with many
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factories reopening and some even in the worst-hit areas. Restaurants and some
essential service offices also have reopened since 28 April on ‘a limited scale’.
Public transport has not yet been put back on wheels. The mismanagement raises
an important issue of who are making these decisions and how they are being
made.    
The most unpleasant side of the COVID-19 restrictions is the unemployment of
millions and the consequent want of food, and the unreasonably high hike in the
prices of essential commodities. Government has begun distribution of rice at
nominal prices, and also as a relief measure. Some elected local leaders, mostly
belonging to the ruling party, have indulged in misappropriation of the relief products.
As a response, the government withdrew politicians from the relief plan and instead
tasked 64 of the most senior civil servants to coordinate relief-distribution. This
shows how the crisis management has become increasingly bureaucratized. Many of
those involved in misappropriation of reliefs have been dismissed and arrested, while
the executive magistrates are enforcing the law against price-hikes and hoarding.
Bangladesh has joined the regional efforts at the SAARC-level in a joint fight against
the pandemic, but it is the only country faced with the challenge of applying the legal
order in the refugee camps in preventing and controlling the COVID-19 outbreak,
where over a million of unrecognized Rohingya refugees live in densely housed
shanties.    
The Public Health Crisis and the Governing Law
With regard to the law dealing with the COVID-19 crisis, the applicable law is the
Communicable Diseases (Prevention, Control, and Eradication) Act 2018, which
replaced several colonial laws including the Epidemic Diseases Act 1897. The
Act empowers the government to control any infectious disease or outbreak, to
enforce ‘isolation’ of any ‘infected’ person (s. 14) and, importantly, to enact ‘rules’
to deal with a situation of health emergency (ss. 32 & 11(3)). Interestingly, the
government has not enacted any such rules or regulations except by issuing one
or two notifications. For example, on March 23, the Ministry of Health notified that
COVID-19 is a communicable disease within the meaning of s. 4 of the 2018 Act.
Yet the crisis was not declared to be a disaster under the Disaster Management Act
2012. This notification is the first source of subsequent actions of the government to
contain and control the spread of the virus. Then, on 16 April, the Health Directorate
issued a statutory order under s. 11(1) of the 2018 Act announcing the whole country
as exposed to COVID-19 risks. The so called ‘Declaration’, however, made several
instructions, with a ‘request’ to the public to comply and maintain social distance and
curfew between 6 pm to 6 am. Non-compliance with the instructions is a punishable
offence which may entail up to 3 month’s imprisonment or 50,000 Taka fine (s. 25).
Not surprisingly, the new delegated legislation do not place any limitations upon
the use of powers enumerated. To enforce the social distancing and stay-at-home
instructions, the government amended the Mobile Courts Act 2009 to empower
executive magistrates to hold summary trial of offences under the 2018 Act.
Executive magistrates also enforce some provisions of the Penal Code 1860
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that criminalizes an act likely to spread any infectious disease (ss. 269-270) and
disobedience to quarantine rule (s. 271).
Impact of Unofficial Emergency or Executive-
Imposed Restrictions
It almost goes without saying that the above administrative restrictions which
create a state of unofficial emergency have significant impact on democracy and
civic rights. From the point of democratic decision-making, the current situation
in Bangladesh suggests that powers are being exercised from a centralized
source without due legal processes nor the oversight or legislative underpinning of
Parliament. The government’s financial stimulus package, for example, does not
have legislative approval, while Parliament has been prorogued after its one-hour
session on 18 April. There is a great uncertainty as to the flow and clarity of legal
orders, which is  antithetical to democracy and the rule of law. The restrictions have
also had an impact on the people’s right to life, liberty and freedom of movements,
with little or no official justifications. A major fallout has been the closure of the
Supreme Court that has power to enforce constitutional rights. Arguably, the closure
of the constitutional court has led to an ipso facto suspension of fundamental rights,
which is a known consequence of an emergency. The Court recently issued a notice
for its limited reopening, which was soon withdrawn.      
The level of legal awareness and degree of law-abidance of the people, as well
as the pattern and nature of official behaviour, varies from society to society. In
Bangladesh, people are not complying with the imposed restrictions in an optimal
way. In some cases, COVID-19 patients, suspected carriers, and even health
professionals have been subjected to social hatred and stigma. On the other hand,
law enforcement officials including executive magistrates have occasionally resorted
to extra-legal means of punishments. The government agencies and departments
have sometimes arrested people on the ground of spreading COVID-19 rumours. A
doctor has been withdrawn from duty for questioning the quality of medical masks,
while another six have been suspended for misconduct without following due
process. It seems that, the emergency-like situation has led to a disproportionate
restriction on the freedom of expression, which is vital at all times and more so
during the COVID-19 crisis.
Conclusion
It appears that Bangladesh’s legal responses to the COVID-19 crisis are
inconsistent, ad hoc, and deficient in transparency and democratic practices. The
unprecedented nature of the pandemic requiring exceptionally urgent actions, may
be attributed to the sorry state of affairs. A thoughtful, more legitimate approach
could nevertheless have been taken. For example, as a commentator has rightly
argued, urgent legislation similar to the Coronavirus Act 2020 of the UK could be
enacted to better tackle the problem. Second, as the nature of the restrictions and
their impact on the constitutional order of the polity show that the government has
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effectively yet unofficially resorted to a state of emergency to deal with the public
health emergency arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. While the question remains
whether the legitimacy of these extraordinary measures can be read from the theory
of ‘constitutional exceptionalism’ (of, e.g., Poole, Dyzenhaus, Gross and Tushnet)
or exceptional legality (of, e.g., Agamben), the pandemic has unveiled the way a
government navigates, and negotiates with, the constitutional means to tackle public
health emergency in one of the most densely populated countries in the world.
Due to an editorial error an earlier version stated that a doctor had been arrested for
questioning the quality of medical masks while he was in fact withdrawn from duty.
The mistake has been corrected.
- 5 -
